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CRIMINAL LAW: VALIDITY OF INCONSISTENT
VERDICTS
THE DILEMMA of inconsistent verdicts is aggravated by resort to in-
flexible rules. Nevertheless, most courts, seemingly unaware of the
presence of divergent policy considerations, apply a single rule to all
types of inconsistent verdicts.' Thus, federal courts and some state
courts uphold inconsistent verdicts in every case. In contrast, other state
courts require that all convictions founded on the return of an incon-
sistent verdict be reversed.
The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Dunn' established
the federal rule that inconsistent verdicts will not be set aside. Federal
' If such policy factors have been considered by the courts, they have rarely been
expressed in the decisions. For an obvious example of an inconsistent verdict see People
v. Stovall, 94 Cal. App. 635, 271 Pac. 576 (1928), where defendant was convicted on a
count of grand theft for stealing an automobile but was acquitted upon a count charging
the statutory offense of driving a vehicle without the owner's consent.
2 784. U.S. 390 (1932). The defendant in Dunn was indicted for (i) maintaining
a liquor nuisance, (z) illegal possession of liquor, and (3) illegal sale of liquor. The
jury convicted defendant on the first count, but acquitted him on the other two. The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction by determining that consistency in a verdict is not
necessary. But see Justice Butler's strong dissent. 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932)-
' Prior to the Dunn case in 1932 there was a split of authority in the circuit courts
on the validity of an inconsistent verdict. In the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits, the rule was that the verdict of guilty on one count would stand, although
inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on another count. See Steckler v. United States,
7 F.zd 59 (2d Cir. 1975)5 Maceo v. United States, 46 F.2d 788 ( 5th Cir. 1931)5
Goszner v. United States, 9 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1925) 5 Carrignan v. United States, z9o
Fed. 189 ( 7 th Cir. 1923). In United States v. Bergdoll, 27z Fed. 498, 505 (E.D. Pa.
19z), the court remarked: "Among the admirable qualities of the human mind and
character, consistency is singled out as a jewel. . . . No one, however, is to be con-
demned for not possessing jewels, and he who has them is not expected to have them
on view at all times. Mere formal logical consistency is not one of the crown jewels
of juries, and happily so."
The Third Circuit, in its pre-Dunn decisions on inconsistent verdicts, held that a
conviction based on an inconsistent verdict would not be upheld unless the verdict of
guilty was supported by evidence other than that offered in support of the counts on
which the defendant was acquitted. Speiller v. United States, 31 F.zd 68z ( 3 d Cir.
1929) 5 John Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. United States, 295 Fed. 4.89 ( 3 d Cir. 1924).
However, there was a split of authority on the validity of an inconsistent verdict within
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Compare Pankratz Lumber Co. v. United States, 5o
F.zd 174 ( 9 th Cir. 1931), Boyle v. United States, 22 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1927) and
Rosenthal v. United States, 276 Fed. 714 ( 9 th Cir. 192i) 5i vt/ Peru v. United States,
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courts readily apply this rule for a simple disposition of the inconsistency
issue,4 at times without determining whether an inconsistency in fact
existed.' Thus Dunn has become an elixir for the perplexing problem
of verdict inconsistency.'
State courts are widely split on the question of the validity of an
inconsistent verdict. Some states, influenced by the reasoning in Dunn,
have refused to reverse a conviction for inconsistency.7 Other jurisdic-
+ F.2d 881 (8th Cir. x925), Bilboa v. United States, 287 Fed. 125 (9th Cir. 1923),
and Boone v. United States, 257 Fed. 963 (8th Cir. ixi9). Because of the split of
authority in the Ninth Circuit before 1932, the court often displayed a tendency to de-
termine that an apparently inconsistent verdict in reality was not necessarily inconsistent.
See United States v. Anderson, 31 F.zd 436 ( 9th Cir. 1929); Hesse v. United States,
28 F.2d 770 ( 9th Cir. 1928) ; Lambert v. United States, 76 F.zd 773 ( 9 th Cir. 1928) ;
Baldini v. United States, 286 Fed. 133 ( 9th Cir. 1923).
For a short resume of the holdings in the circuit courts prior to Dunn see Annot.,
8o A.L.R. 171 (1932).
'Most of the federal decisions on inconsistent verdicts since 1932 have adopted the
rule established in Dunn to uphold a conviction on one count, when the defendant was
acquitted on other counts--a situation similar to that presented in the Dunn case itself.
Tri-Angle Club, Inc. v. United States, 265 F.2d 829 (Sth Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 195o ) 5 Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884
( 9th Cir. 1949) 5 Pilgreen v. United States, 157 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1946). However, a
-substantial number of decisions have broadly applied Dunn to inconsistent verdicts of a
different nature than that involved in the Dunn case. See United States v. Dotterwelch,
320 U.S. 277 (1943); Apodaca v. United States, x88 F.2d 932 (xoth Cir. 195x ) ; United
States v. General Motors Corp., 1zx F.2d 376 ( 7th Cir. 194 ) ; Chiaravalloti v. United
States, 6o F.zd x92 ( 7th Cir. 1932).
'See, e.g., United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 ( 7th Cir. 195x);
Robinson v. United States, 175 F.2d 4 ( 9th Cir. 1949) Maugeri v. United States, So
F.2d i99 ( 9th Cir. 1935). In Stein v. United States, 153 F.zd 737, 744 (9th Cir.
1946), the court stated: "We perceive no inconsistency in the verdicts, but even if there
were, this court has uniformly ruled that inconsistency as to verdicts in plurality of
-counts in one indictment or information is not fatal."
In only one known instance has a federal court indicated a disinclination toward
adopting the broad propositions of Dunn. Manley v. United States, 238 F.2d 221
(6th Cir. 1956). In that case the court held that an inconsistency alone was not grounds
for reversal, but when an obviously inconsistent verdict is returned, both the trial court
and the reviewing court should be extraordinarily careful in scrutinizing the record to
ascertain any prejudicial error. The appellate court, upon discovery of such error in
that case, reversed the trial court decision upholding the inconsistent verdict.
'Florida: Goodwin v. State, 157 Fla. 751, 26 So. 2d 898 (1946) (citing Dunn).
Indiana: Sichick v. State, 89 Ind. App. 132, x66 N.E. t4 (1929). Kansas: State v.
Phillips, 136 Kan. 407, x5 P.2d 408 (1932) (citing Dunn) ; State v. Brundige, r14
Kan. 849, 220 Pac. 1039 (1923). Montana: State v. Daly, 77 Mont. 387, 25o Pac.
976 (1926). Nebraska: Weinecke v. State, 34 Neb. 14, 51 N.W. 307 (5892). New
Jersey: State v. Friedman, 98 N.J.L. 577, 1zo Atl. 8 (1922). North Carolina: State
v. Davis, 2x4 N.C. 787, 1 S.E.zd 1o4 (5939). Ohio: Browning v. State, 1zo Ohio
St. 62, x65 N.E. 566 (1929); Griffin v. State, x8 Ohio St. 438 (x868) (leading case).
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tions, however, hold inconsistent verdicts void, relying upon the com-
mon law principle that no verdict will be upheld which creates a re-
pugnancy or absurdity in a conviction."
The few courts that have reviewed an inconsistent verdict reached by
a judge as the trier of fact have failed to distinguish this situation from
the ordinary jury inconsistency, 9 apparently relying on the doctrine that
waiver of jury trial substitutes the judge for the jury in all respects.10
Although the defendant in Dann was tried before a jury, application of
the Dunn rule to judge-rendered inconsistent verdicts is somewhat
justified by the broad language of that case." However, in a recent
decision, United States v. Maybury, 2 the Court of Appeals for the
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Parrotto, 189 Pa. Super. 415, 15o A.2d 396 (1959)
(citing Dunn) Commonwealth v. Watt, 187 Pa. Super. 51, 142 A.2d 423 (1958).
South Dakota: State v. Sinnott, 72 S.D. 100, 3o N.W.2d 455 (947) (citing Dunn).
Wisconsin: Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 44o, 41 N.W.2d 642 (195o) (citing Dunn).
Prior to 1932 Colorado had adopted the rule that an inconsistent verdict required
reversal, but in reliance on Dunn this jurisdiction promptly embraced the opposite view
and upheld such verdicts. Compare Webb v. People, 83 Colo. 1, 262 Pac. 906 (927),
with Crane v. People, 91 Colo. 21, x1 P.2d 567 (932), and Elstun v. People, o4
Colo. 302, 91 P.2d 487 (939).
aIn Commonwealth v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 6o, 6z (188o), the court stated: "The
record showed a verdict so inconsistent with itself, and so uncertain in law, that no
judgment could be entered upon it." Arizona: State v. Fling, 69 Ariz. 94, 21o P.zd
225 (1949). California: Ex parte Johnston, 3 Cal. App. 2d 32, 43 P.2d 541 0935)
People v. Koehn, 207 Cal. App. 6o5, 279 Pac. 646 (5929). Georgia: Kuck v. State,
149 Ga. 191, 99 S.E. 622 (i919) (leading case). Illinois: Tobin v. People, 1o4 Ill.
565 (1882) (leading case). Washington: State v. O'Neil, 24 Wash.2d 802, x67 P.2d
471 (1946) 5 State v. Tuerk, 165 Wash. 322, 5 P.2d 308 (1931). See also 2 BISHOP,
NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1o5 (2d ed. 1913).
'In McElheny v. United States, 146 F.zd 932 ( 9 th Cir. 1944), the Dunn rule was
applied to a trial before a judge without discussing whether the considerations were
necessarily the same. Until the present case, McElleny was apparently the onli
federal decision involving an inconsistent verdict reached by a judge as trier of facts.
For two state cases in which a judge returned an inconsistent verdict, see De Mott v.
Notey, 4 Misc. 2d 996, 159 N.Y.S.2d 1o (Nassau County Ct. 1956) (a misdemeanor
tried before a police justice), and Jones v. State, 204 Md. 55, 1o2 A.2d 714 (954).
Neither court made a distinction between an inconsistent jury verdict and an inconsistent
verdict in a case tried before a judge.
20 4ccord, United States v. Dudley, 260 F.zd 439 (2d Cir. 1958).
11 The Supreme Court in Dunn stated: "Consistency in the verdict is not necessary."
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
12 274 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 196o). The defendant in Maybury was indicted on two
counts, for forgery of a check, and for uttering the same check knowing that it was
forged. The only evidence offered by the government as to defendant's knowledge that
the check had been forged was that the defendant himself had forged it. The trial
judge, jury having been waived, acquitted the defendant on the forgery count but
convicted him for uttering. On appeal, the defendant contended that the conviction
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Second Circuit, after a thorough analysis of the Dunn rule,'8 held that
policy considerations permitting jury inconsistencies were not applicable
in a case tried to a judge and thus limited this rule to jury verdicts. 4
on the uttering count should be set aside on the ground that it was inconsistent with an
acquittal on the forgery count. The court upheld his contention, ruling that the
conviction on the uttering count could not stand because of the inconsistency of an
acquittal on the forgery count.
Judge Friendly was in favor of a new trial on both counts, but Judge Lumbard
was of the opinion that the prohibitions of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel
barred retrial on either count. Judge Hand, while doubting the appellate court's ability
to determine from the record whether the trial judge's findings were inconsistent, voted
with Judge Friendly to retry the defendant on the uttering count and with Judge
Lumbard to bar a retrial on the forgery count. Thus, by compromise a majority of the
court held that the defendant could be retried only on the uttering count.
Forgery and uttering an instrument knowing it to be forged are separate crimes.
See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 414. (1934)5 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 307 (1957).
Thus an acquittal on one count of an indictment charging both uttering and forgery
would not usually be inconsistent with a conviction on the other count. See Pope v. State,
42 Ga. App. 68o, 157 S.E. 211 (1931); and State v. Hobl, io8 Kan. 261, 194. Pac.
921 (1921) and State v. Donald, 9o Utah 533, 63 P.2d 246 (1936). However, where
the only evidence of knowledge of the falsity of the forged instrument to support a
conviction for uttering is derived from evidence that the defendant had forged the in-
strument himself, a conviction on the uttering count would necessarily be logically
inconsistent with an acquittal on forgery. Conley v. United States, 257 F.2d 141 (6th
Cir. 1958) i State v. Lovell, 132 Kan. 759, 297 Pac. 685 (1935).
"8 The Maybury case is the first decision in which the Dunn rule has been thoroughly
analyzed. By limiting the rule to jury verdicts, it is the first holding to place any
restriction on the broad application of that rule. For an example of the perfunctory
approach of the federal courts to inconsistent verdicts since the Dunn decision, see
Borum v. United States, 284. U.S. 596 (932) ; United States v. Chiarella, x84 F.2d 903
(2d Cir. 195o); and Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1933).
"' If it is determined that an inconsistent verdict cannot stand, the difficult problem
of whether the defendant should be retried arises. Before the Dunn case in 1932 a
majority of the federal courts that considered this question held that res judicata pre-
cluded a conviction on one count after an acquittal on another, and dismissed the
defendant. See Pankratz Lumber Co. v. United Startes, So F.2d 174 (9 th Cir. 1931),
and John Hohenadel Brewing Co. v. United States, 295 Fed. 489 ( 3d Cir. 1924).
Contra, Rosenthal v. United States, 276 Fed. 714 (gth Cir. 1921) (inconsistent verdict
reversed and case remanded for a new trial on both counts).
This question of retrial is entirely unsettled in the state courts. A number of states
hold that an acquittal on one count is conclusive as to other counts, thus barring a con-
viction; the defendant is therefore dismissed. State v. Fling, 69 Ariz. 94, 21o P.2d 221
(i949); Ex parte Johnston, 3 Cal.2d 32, 43 P.2d 541 (-935) ; Webb v. People, 83
Colo. 1, 262 Pac. 9o6 (1927). Other states hold that after reversal of an inconsistent
verdict, defendant should be retried on all counts under which he had been originally
indicted. State v. Akers, 278 Mo. 368, 213 S.W. 424 (i919); State v. O'Neil, 24
Wash. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 471 (.946).
The unparalleled approach adopted in Maybury of retrying the defendant only on
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The reasons most frequently cited to explain inconsistent jury ver-
dicts and to justify their being sustained are that they represent an
attempt to mitigate punishment or a compromise by the jury in order
to reach a unanimous decision.15 However, an inconsistent verdict
reached by a judge is obviously not prompted by such considerations.
By carefully examining the policy considerations behind the federal rule
on inconsistent verdicts the court in the instant case logically limited the
Dunn rule to jury verdicts.
Nevertheless, the court in Maybary seemingly overlooked a prin-
ciple greatly relied upon in the Dunn decision, namely, that consistency
the count under which he had been convicted is a satisfactory solution to this problem.
Thus, defendant is neither completely discharged nor does he risk retrial on all counts.
15 Inconsistent verdicts have often been attributed to leniency on the part of the
jury. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.s. 390 (932) 5 United States v. Cindrich, 241
F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1957); and Boone v. United States, 257 Fed. 963 (8th Cir. 1gg).
In the leading decision supporting this proposition, Steckler v. United States, 7 F.zd
59, 6o (2d Cir. 1925), the court stated: "The most that can be said in such cases is
that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not
speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of
the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of
a power which they had no right to exercise but to which they were disposed through
lenity." The Supreme Court in Dunn relied heavily on the leniency argument asserted
in Steckler.
Juries may hesitate to return verdicts of guilty on a large number of counts when
the punishment that may be imposed on each count is severe. See Boone v. United
States, 257 Fed. 963 (8th Cir. gxig). Although sentences usually run concurrently
when a defendant is convicted on more than one count, fines and prison sentences have
been accumulated from each conviction returned. See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 153
F.2d 8x6 (7 th Cir. 1946). The imposition of consecutive sentences lies within the
discretion of the trial judge. Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 535 (932).
An inconsistent verdict may also be the product of a jury's compromise in order
to reach a unanimous decision. If a majority of the jury is inclined to return a con-
viction on every count, but a few of the jurors are unwilling to convict on all counts,
a compromise may result---conviction on some counts and acquittal on others. The strict
criminal law requirement of unanimity is satisfied, although an inconsistent erdict
results. Accord, Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948)5 Hibdon v. United
States, 204 F.zd 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
Only a few federal courts have imputed an inconsistent verdict to a mistake or
misconception on the part of the jury. See Grant v. United States, 255 F.2d 341
(6th Cir. 1958), and United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.zd 376 (7th Cir.
194).
The majority of state courts that uphold inconsistent verdicts have taken the
detached attitude that the defendant is in no position to complain, since the jury re-
turned a verdict more favorable than deserved on the evidence. See Sichick v. State,
89 Ind. App. 132, 166 N.E. 14 (1929); State v. Brundige, 114. Kan. 84-9, 220 Pac.
1039 (1923) State v. Davis, 214 N.C. 787, 1 S.E.2d io4 (939).
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in verdicts is not required since each count acts as a separate indictment.1 6
This principle is equally applicable to cases tried before a judge. The
separate indictment rule, however, is of questionable origin. Its source
was a nineteenth century English decision that upheld a conviction
on one count, even though the jury had failed to return its verdict on
another count.17  Since that time the supposition that each count has the
legal effect of a separate indictment has been asserted in practically
every case sustaining convictions founded on inconsistent verdicts.',8
Perhaps the Maybury decision reflects a conscious determination to
disregard the multicount principle. The court based its decision squarely
on seldom mentioned policies. This functional approach, it is sub-
mitted, is preferable to the a priori procedure of most courts that have
adopted the multicount separate indictment principle.
While the judge-jury distinction drawn by the Maybury court
prescribes a sound limitation on the federal rule on inconsistent verdicts,
a further advance by the courts is suggested by the analytical approach
adopted in this case. Distinctions should be drawn between the types
of inconsistent verdicts.' 9 For example, the most common type of in-
consistency is illustrated by Dann, where a defendant charged with
several related crimes was acquitted on some counts and convicted on
"As Judge Holmes explained in the Dunn case: "If separate indictments had been
presented against the defendant for possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and
had been separately tried, the same evidence being offered in support of each, an
acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicatet of the other. Where the offenses
are separately charged in the counts of a single indictment the same rule must bold."
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). But see Sealfon v. United States, 322 U.s. 575 (1948),
where the Supreme Court held that res jiulicata precluded a later conviction based on
a separate indictment for the substantive crime, after the defendant had been acquitted
under an indictment charging conspiracy to commit that crime.
7 Latham v. The Queen, 5 B.&S. 635, 122 Eng. Rep. 968 (Q.B. 1864).
"
8 E.g., Carroll v. United States, x6 F.zd 95! (ad Cir. 1927) ; Gozner v. United
States, 9 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 19z5); United States v. Malone, 9 Fed. 897 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1881) i Williams v. State, 2o4 Md. 55, io2 A.2d 714 (1954), Browning v.
State, 12o Ohio St. 62, 165 N.E. 566 (19z9) 5 Griffin v. State, 18 Ohio St. 438 (1868);
Commonwealth v. Watt, 187 Pa. Super 51, 142 A.zd 423 (1958).
9 While courts have failed to distinguish the different types of inconsistent verdicts,
scholars in the field of criminal procedure have not only failed to make such distinctions,
but have neglected the whole subject of "inconsistent verdicts." See 5 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § Z128 (12th ed. 1957), where the problem of ver-
dict consistency is considered in three short paragraphs, and ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURF FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 483 (947), where three somewhat longer para-
graphs are devoted to inconsistent verdicts. Another leading authority on criminal pro-
cedure, MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1959), fails even to consider
inconsistent verdicts.
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others on evidence that logically would require conviction or acquittal
on all.20 Such an inconsistent verdict may well be imputed to the
underlying considerations of leniency or compromise by the jury.2" In
contrast, where a single defendant is convicted of both larceny and
receiving stolen property, crimes which by their nature cannot be com-
mitted by the same person,22 the verdict is not a result of jury leniency
or compromise. Therefore, because the policy considerations appropri-
ate to one type of inconsistent verdict may not be applicable to another
type of inconsistency,' courts should not indiscriminately apply a gen-
eral rule of validity or fatality to every inconsistent verdict.
"0 This type of inconsistency was prevelant during prohibition, when it was common
to indict a defendant on three counts: (i) selling liquor, (2) possessing liquor, and
(3) maintaining a common nuisance. The inconsistency resulted when the defendant
was convicted on some counts and acquitted on others on evidence sufficient to uphold
a conviction on all three counts. See Stockman v. United States, 8 F.2d z2i ( 9 th Cir.
1925) i Marshallo v. United States, 298 Fed. 74 (zd Cir. 1974)5 John Hohenadel
Brewing Co. v. United States, 295 Fed. 489 ( 3 d Cir. 1924)5 Carrignan v. United
States, 290 Fed. 189 ( 7 th Cir. 1923)5 Bilboa v. United States, 287 Fed. 125 ( 9 th Cir.
1923); Baldini v. United States, 286 Fed. E33 ( 9 th Cir. 1923). However, there are
many other situations in which an acquittal on one or more counts would be inconsistent
with a conviction on other counts. For example, in United States v. Chiarella, 184.
F.zd 903 (2d Cir. 195o), a general indictment for counterfeiting charged four counts:
(i) receiving, (2) possessing, (3) selling, and (4) conspiracy. Defendant was found
guilty by the jury only on the second count. In Catrino v. United States, 176 F.zd 884
( 9 th Cir. 1949), defendant was prosecuted under two counts: (i) subornation of per-
jury and (z) obstruction of justice. He was convicted on the second count, but ac-
quitted on the first. See case cited note i supra, and forgery and uttering cases cited
note 12 supra.
See note 14 supra.
22 This type of inconsistent verdict is manifestly different from that found in Dunn.
The underlying policy consideration of leniency and compromise have no merit in this
situation, since a jury is hardly lenient when it convicts the defendant of both crimes,
and certainly there is no compromise, since a unanimous verdict was returned on both
counts. While no court 'has upheld an inconsistency resulting from conviction on two
counts charging separate crimes that by their nature cannot be committed by the same
person, such an inconsistent verdict has in certain jurisdictions become the basis of a
general rule requiring reversal for all inconsistent verdicts. See Tobin v. People, 04
Ill. 565 (1882) (conviction on counts of larceny and receiving) ; Commonwealth v.
Haskins, 128 Mass. 6o (1879) (also larceny and receiving). The two preceding cases
established the rule in their respective jurisdictions, that an inconsistent verdict cannot
stand. For other decisions holding that a conviction rendered on counts charging crimes
which by their nature cannot be committed by the same person, see Davis v. United
States, 37 App. D.C. 126 ( 19 1) (one count charging false pretenses, another charging
embezzlement, defendant convicted of both crimes) i State v. Friedman, 98 N.J.L. 577,
12o AtI. 8 (1922) (larceny and receiving); The Queen v. Evans, 7 Cox C.C. 15z
(1856) (stealing and receiving).
"5 Several other types of inconsistent verdicts should be distinguished. An incon-
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Several courts have followed a sounder course of examining the type
of inconsistency involved in each case.24  For example, in one case a
defendant was indicted on two counts, each charging substantially the
same crime. The court held that the conviction on one count could
not stand beside acquittal on the other.2" In a later case the same court
sistent verdict has frequently been returned in cases in which a corporation and its
officers have been jointly indicted for the same crime; on the same evidence the corporate
defendant is convicted while the individual defendants are acquitted. See Magnolia
Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.zd 950 (gth Cir. 1959); Southern Ad-
vance Bag & Paper Co. v. United States, 133 F.zd 449 ( 5 th Cir. 1943) ; American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 13o F.zd z33 (D.C. Cir. i94z) ; Pankratz Lumber Co.
v. United States, 5o F.zd 174 ( 9 th Cir. 1930) Such inconsistency can be attributed
to leniency by the jury. Compare United States v. Dotterweicb, 320 U.S. 277 (1943),
where the corporation president was convicted and the corporate defendant was ac-
quitted. The court imputed such an inconsistency to carelessness, compromise, or a
belief that the responsible individual should suffer the penalty instead of merely in-
creasing the cost of running the business.
Another distinct type of inconsistency results when some co-defendants are acquitted
and others convicted on evidence equally strong against all. See Apodaca v. United
States; 188 F.zd 932 (oth Cir. x95s); Chiaravalloti v. United States, 6o F.zd 19z
( 7 th Cir. 1932) ; Nadi v. United States, 6 F.2d 574 ( 7 th Cir. 1925) , United States v.
Bergdoll, 27z Fed. 498 (E.D. Pa. x921). While this form of inconsistency may
possibly be attributed to jury leniency, such a power on the part of the jury should not
be sanctioned by the courts in this situation. The jury can either believe or disbelieve
the testimony of a witness, but the jury should not have the power to believe the testi-
mony of a witness as to one defendant, and to discredit the testimony of the same witness
as to a' co-defendant.
Still another type of inconsistent verdict results when a defendant is indicted under
counts charging substantially the same crime, and a conviction is returned on each count.
E.g., Griffin v. State, r8 Ohio St. 438 (iS68) (conviction returned on each of several
counts "charging the same murder but on different days). See Fulton v. United States,
t5 App. D.C. z7 (i916) (defendant charged on one count of embezzlement from A,
and in another count with embezzlement of the same money from B, C, D, and E, jury
returned a conviction on both counts). This type of inconsistency would seem to arise
from a misconception or mistake by the jury, not from jury leniency or compromise.
As can readily be seen, policy considerations will vary depending on the type of
inconsistency. Courts have not only failed to consider the reasons behind a particular
inconsistent verdict but have also failed to distinguish one type of inconsistency from
another. Because of this failure to draw such distinctions an all-encompassing rule has
been applied to this variety of inconsistencies, often resulting in injustice to a particular
defendant.
U Compare Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 1z8 (t945)
, 
its Williams v.
State, 204 Md. 55, oz A.2d 714 (1954) and Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 1oo A.zd
789 (1953). In the Leet case the court stated: "While it is true that a finding of
guilt on two inconsistent counts will be declared invalid in Maryland . . . it does not
follow that a conviction on one count may not stand because of an inconsistent acquittal
on another count." Id. at 293, 1oo A.2d at 793.
'State v. Akers, 278 Mo. 368, 213 S.W. 424 (99).
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held that a conviction for possessing liquor and an acquittal for trans-
porting it, although inconsistent, did not constitute grounds for re-
versal.26 Most courts, however, have failed to distinguish the diverse
types of inconsistencies.2
The Maybury decision has introduced an intelligent approach into
this neglected and confused area of the law. It may well establish
a definite trend away from a blind following of the Dann rule, not
so much because of its narrow holding, but because of its careful analysis
of the law of "inconsistent verdicts."
"'State v. Ridge, 275 S.W. 59 (Mo. App. .9±5).
u' If such distinctions were made, and cases decided accordingly, any resulting conflict
among the various jurisdictions as to the validity of a particular type of inconsistency
would be attributable to diverse policy considerations of the desirability of requiring an
impeccable verdict in a specific situation.
